


# The Political Economy of the Welfare State in Latin America

Globalization, Democracy, and Development



Alex Segura-Ubiergo

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## THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WELFARE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA

This book is one of the first attempts to analyze how developing countries through the early twenty-first century have established systems of social protection and how these systems have been affected by the recent processes of globalization and democratization. The book focuses on Latin America, a pioneer in welfare state development in the developing world, to identify factors associated with the evolution of welfare state policies during the preglobalization period prior to 1979 and studies how globalization and democratization in the last thirty years affected governments' fiscal commitment to social spending. In contrast with the Western European experience, more developed welfare systems evolved in countries relatively closed to international trade, while the recent process of globalization that has swept the region has put substantial downward pressure on social security expenditures. Health and education spending has been relatively protected from greater exposure to international markets and has actually increased substantially with the shift to democracy.

Alex Segura-Ubiergo is Resident Representative in Senegal and the Gambia for the International Monetary Fund (IMF), where he has served as an economist since 2001. Dr. Segura-Ubiergo is the recipient of the Mancur Olson Award for the best dissertation in political economy in 2001–2002. He holds degrees in economics and political science from the Autonomous University of Barcelona and a Ph.D. obtained with distinction from Columbia University, where he held a Fulbright Scholarship.



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International Monetary Fund



**CAMBRIDGE**  
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo

Cambridge University Press

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

[www.cambridge.org](http://www.cambridge.org)

Information on this title: [www.cambridge.org/9780521871112](http://www.cambridge.org/9780521871112)

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First published in print format 2007

ISBN-13 978-0-511-28948-4 eBook (EBL)

ISBN-10 0-511-28948-0 eBook (EBL)

ISBN-13 978-0-521-87111-2 hardback

ISBN-10 0-521-87111-5 hardback

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*Als meus pares, el meu avi, i a la Mariella*





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## Acknowledgments

This is a book about economics and politics, two disciplines that have been strongly related since the time Adam Smith and David Ricardo referred to modern-day economics as political economy more than two hundred years ago. Over the years, I have accumulated debts with experts in both fields; they have taught me that economic analysis without a careful regard for political and institutional issues remains largely incomplete (and, I would add, uninteresting), while political analysis can also benefit in substance and rigor from the solid micro-foundations and the strong methodological traditions of economics.

While I cannot list all the people whose ideas have influenced my thinking over the years, I would like to single out some individuals who either provided direct comments to my manuscript or influenced my thinking in one way or another. This book is certainly a better one thanks to them. To be sure, all remaining faults and weaknesses are mine alone.

My first debt of gratitude is to Professor Carlos Mulas-Granados, admired colleague and best friend, who has shared my passion for economics and politics since we met at Columbia University almost ten years ago. He introduced me to some of the recent literature on the political economy of the welfare state, which he had become acquainted with thanks to seminars he had taken with Gøsta Esping-Andersen and Francis Castles – two giants of the study of the welfare state – at the Juan March Institute in Madrid. This book would not have been possible without him.

My second debt of gratitude is to Robert Kaufman, Alfred Stepan, Alfred Fishlow, and Robert Shapiro from Columbia University. Professor Kaufman was the first to introduce me to Latin American political economy. The idea for this book developed in a political economy seminar that he led at Columbia University. We coauthored an article in *World Politics* that became the foundation for some of the more detailed quantitative research

that is presented in this book. I could not be more grateful for the advice and guidance, at all levels, that he has continually provided over the years, to the very last stages of this book. Alfred Stepan taught me most of what I know about political institutions, and convinced me (given my obsession for econometrics and quantitative methods) that analytical arguments should not hide behind seemingly sophisticated formulas. “If you cannot say it in simple words, it cannot be an important argument,” he used to tell me. I hope that I have been able to follow his advice in this book. His infectious passion for interdisciplinary knowledge and his encyclopedic knowledge of political institutions around the world have always impressed me tremendously. Alfred Fishlow’s scholarship on economic history has been another source of inspiration since I was a young student of economics in Spain and read with fascination his work on railroads and the American economy. It was a great honor to have him as a member of my dissertation committee at Columbia University. His work also had a great influence on this book, especially on Chapter 2. Robert Shapiro was the best professor of statistics and quantitative methods that I have ever had. He taught me that methods are nothing without good underlying theories and was always an example of dedication and commitment.

Third, I would like to thank three great economists I had the honor to work with during my first assignment at the International Monetary Fund: Marcelo Selowsky, Montek Ahluwalia, and David Goldsbrough. In different ways they all taught me something that has made this book better. Montek Ahluwalia, the first Director of the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office, is an intellectual giant with an elegance in presenting compelling arguments that is rarely seen. David Goldsbrough was widely seen as one of the best senior managers of the institution: he has an admirable combination of intelligence, modesty, and friendliness and a rare capacity to lead effective teams. However, my greatest debt is to Marcelo Selowsky, a distinguished economist from the University of Chicago and former World Bank chief economist for Latin America and later Eastern Europe and Central Asia. His intuitive approach to economics (yet based on strong analytical fundamentals), his imaginative thinking, and his capacity to grasp “the big picture” are unparalleled. If I have been able to use even a fragment of these skills, this book will be a success.

Other people that I would also like to thank for reasons that I cannot name individually include Francisco Rivera-Batiz, Jagdish Baghwati, Edmund Phelps, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Helen Milner, Arturo Sotomayor, Alina Rocha Menocal, Emilio Pineda, and Marta Noguer from Columbia University; Pau Rabanal and Marc Siscart from New York University; Julio Cotler, Carolina