By Rik Peels
This edited assortment specializes in the ethical and social dimensions of ignorance―an undertheorized type in analytic philosophy. individuals tackle such concerns because the relation among lack of know-how and deception, lack of information as an ethical excuse, lack of awareness as a criminal excuse, and the relation among lack of awareness and ethical personality. within the ethical realm, lack of know-how is usually regarded as an excuse; a few particular form of lack of information appears implied via an ethical personality; and lack of awareness is heavily concerning ethical hazard. lack of expertise has definite social dimensions in addition: it's been claimed to be the engine of technology; it kind of feels to be entailed via privateness and secrecy; and it's largely concept to represent a felony excuse in definite situations. jointly, those contributions supply a sustained inquiry into the character of lack of information and the pivotal function it performs within the ethical and social domain names.
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This edited assortment specializes in the ethical and social dimensions of ignorance―an undertheorized class in analytic philosophy. members handle such matters because the relation among lack of expertise and deception, lack of awareness as an ethical excuse, lack of understanding as a felony excuse, and the relation among lack of know-how and ethical personality.
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Additional info for Perspectives on Ignorance from Moral and Social Philosophy
Although psychopaths clearly lack a moral capacity on almost any understanding of capacity, there are lots of other cases where it is much less clear that what is missing is a capacity. In other cases, such as JoJo, if what is missing is a capacity, it is a capacity in a special sense, and the use of that sense requires further justification. Take first, the case most favorable to proponents of the capacity condi tion: psychopaths. It is not at all clear what we mean by that term. We may mean people who lack executive control, who are deranged or psychotic, and in that case I think it is fairly clear that they are not responsible.
There doesn’t seem to be a relevant difference between very strong motivations to φ and motivations so strong that not-φing is not possible. Put like this, it seems that we are deflating the notion of moral incapacity to almost nothing. Perhaps saying that Washington could not tell a lie is just a hyperbolic way of saying that he is very good. This doesn’t support an asymmetry—if we say that an agent is very bad, so strongly motivated to the bad that he can’t bring himself to act well, he seems blameworthy.
Presumably, the agent would have to be blameworthy for something like an act or choice, and her blamewor thiness for the harm would then be inherited from her blameworthiness for those other things, assuming that the relevant epistemic conditions for responsibility are satisfied. So this suggests that perhaps, in cases of this kind, the conditions for responsibility should not be analyzed in terms of a freedom condition and an epistemic condition, but, instead, as something like an inherited responsibility condition and an epistemic condition.