By D. Moyal-Sharrock
This publication sheds unparalleled gentle on Wittgenstein's 3rd masterpiece, On walk in the park , clarifying his techniques on uncomplicated ideals and rebuttal of scepticism. As an creation and statement on Wittgenstein's ultimate significant philosophical paintings, Moyal-Sharrock's publication will end up an necessary advisor to the scholar, pupil and normal reader.
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Extra info for Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
And this seems as discomforting for Peter Hacker as it was for Moore. Though he admits that a grammatical proposition is ‘best The Nonpropositionality of Some Propositions 41 viewed … as a rule’ (1989, 198), Hacker seems to think that nothing is wrong with our idea of necessarily true propositions (true arithmetical, or more generally grammatical, propositions): Surely it is true that 2 ϩ 3 ϭ 5? Indeed it is; that is what is called a true proposition of arithmetic. (1989, 207n) If bipolarity is definitive of the proposition, rules can only be illegitimate pseudopropositions.
Moore recalls (MWL 55–9), Wittgenstein used the word ‘proposition’ to refer not only to empirical propositions (or descriptions or hypotheses), but also to mathematical equations, expressions of grammatical rules (MWL 60), and first-person psychological expressions (MWL 59). As Moore notes: … he seemed to me often to use the words ‘proposition’ and ‘sentence’ as if they meant the same, perhaps partly because the German word ‘Satz’ may be properly used for either; and therefore often talked as if sentences could be ‘true’.
The claim to knowledge, however honestly made, is never a guarantee of truth: ‘One always forgets the expression “I thought I knew” ’ (OC 12): The wrong use made by Moore of the proposition ‘I know …’ lies in his regarding it as an utterance as little subject to doubt as ‘I am in pain’. And since from ‘I know it is so’ there follows ‘It is so’, then the latter can’t be doubted either. (OC 178) – or so Moore thinks. But in fact this wrong assumption is due to a confusion. As Thomas Morawetz makes clear: The assertion that ‘I know’ guarantees what is known rests on a confusion between knowing and claiming to know.