By Jonathan Slapin
''This is an awesome booklet. The questions that Slapin asks approximately intergovernmental meetings (IGCs) within the ecu Union are terribly vital and impressive, with implications for the ecu and for foreign cooperation extra normally. moreover, Slapin's theorizing of his center questions is rigorous, lucid, and available to scholarly readers with out huge formal modeling historical past . . . This publication is an outstanding, critical contribution to the literature on ecu studies.''
---Mark Pollack, Temple University
''An first-class instance of the starting to be literature that brings smooth political technological know-how to undergo at the politics of the ecu Union.''
---Michael Laver, ny University
Veto rights could be a significant resource of strength basically whilst leaving a company is very not going. for instance, small ecu states have periodically wielded their veto privileges to override the personal tastes in their greater, extra economically and militarily strong associates whilst negotiating eu Union treaties, which require the unanimous consent of all ecu members.
Jonathan B. Slapin strains the ancient improvement of the veto privilege within the european and the way a veto---or veto threat---has been hired in treaty negotiations of the earlier twenty years. As he explains, the significance of veto strength in treaty negotiations is likely one of the good points that distinguishes the european from different overseas agencies within which go out and expulsion threats play a better position. while, the prominence of veto energy implies that bargaining within the ecu seems to be extra like bargaining in a federal method. Slapin's findings have major ramifications for the examine of overseas negotiations, the layout of overseas companies, and ecu integration.
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Extra resources for Veto Power: Institutional Design in the European Union
On this particular issue, member states decided that the European Parliament should not have the right to censure individual Commissioners, so this issue is coded 0 in the data. A complete list of all 228 issues comprising the dataset can be found in this chapter’s appendix. The data are constructed from two primary sources. First, I use a report written by the European Parliament taskforce responsible for monitoring and documenting the IGC process. In February 1995 the EP set up a taskforce to monitor the preparatory stages of the 1996 IGC.
Of the original 228 draft issues, 70 issues were fully included in the treaty. The negotiators came to a lesser compromise on an additional 15 issues, and 143 issues were dropped entirely, leaving the status quo. The fact that the German research team was able to collapse the original 252 issues into 228 does raise the question of what constitutes a separate, independent issue in this dataset. My strategy, and the Case Selection 25 strategy of the original coders, was to err on the side of preserving too much data and risking non-independence of issues rather than throw out interesting data.
One may also interpret this as implicit support of the status quo because it means that the government actors cannot agree on a position which would alter the status quo. To test this, I examine missing preferences as a function of government composition. Specifically I examine whether the member state had a single party government or a governing coalition at the time of negotiations. 28 Veto Power Third, member states may have a preference but they may strategically hide that preference if they feel that their position is unpopular.